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The Taxation of ADEA Settlements
and the Lack of Personal Injury in
Age Discrimination Claims
Commissionerv. Schleier
I. INTRODUCTION
Age discrimination is one of the hottest areas of employment litigation.'
With corporate downsizing becoming the norm in American business, the use
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) has flooded courts
with claims of age discrimination.' The twenty-five largest job cuts since
1991 have cost 600,000 workers their jobs.' The volume of discrimination
suits in general increased seventy-seven percent from 1979 to 1988.' Age
discrimination suits are no exception. Awards for discrimination are generally
large compared to most plaintiffs' average income. A question arises whether
awards from a successful discrimination claim should be subject to federal
income tax. How much income tax does one have to pay when receiving a
jury award or settling a case? The answer to that question has important
implications.'
Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") defines gross
income as "all income from whatever source derived."'7 Section 104(a)(2) of
the Code, however, specifically excludes from gross income "the amount of
any damages received... on account of personal injuries or sickness."8 The

1. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
2. Julie M. Buchanan, Age Discrimination Complaints Rising Steadily,
MiLwAUKEE SENTkEL,

May 4, 1992, at 10B.

3. More Than Half a Million Job Cuts in 1994: Year-end Research Indicates
Layoffs Are Way of Life for Corporations,PR NEWsWE, Jan. 5, 1995.
4. The Pain of Downsizing,Bus. WK., May 9, 1994, at 1.
5. Timothy Noah and Albert R. Karr, What New Civil Rights Law Will Mean,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1991, at B1.
6. For example, in 1992, a jury awarded $27 million in damages to a 65 year
old man for an age discrimination case. The taxes due on such an award could be
very large indeed. See Jamie Beckett, Attorneys Expect Increasein Job-Bias Suits,
L. A. DAiLy NEws, Aug. 10, 1992, at N3.
7. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994).
8. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994). Congress amended § 104 in 1989 by providing

that any punitive damages received in a case not involving physical injuries or
sickness are not to be excluded from gross income. Schleier, and most ADFA
cases discussed in this note arose before the 1989 amendment and are not subject to
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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importance of this exclusion cannot be overstated, especially when dealing
with extremely large judgment or settlement amounts. The United States
Supreme Court, in Commissionerv. Schleier, addressed the question of what
types of damage awards or settlements are excluded from gross income by
section 104(a)(2).
This Note will proceed in five parts. Part II will discuss the factual
background of the Schleier case and the holding of the Supreme Court."° Part
III will briefly outline the legal background behind ADEA awards and their
potential section 104(a)(2) treatment." Next, part IV examines the decision
and analysis of the Supreme Court in Schleier.a2 Finally, part V comments on
the Court's holding and discusses the policy implications of the decision.' 3
This Note then concludes that Congress needs to act to provide for exclusion
from gross income amounts received from a settlement or jury award of a
discrimination claim.
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Erich Schleier filed suit against the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service in the Tax Court after the Commissioner issued a deficiency
notice on Mr. Schleier's 1986 federal income tax return. 4 The deficiency
related to a settlement agreement between Mr. Schleier and United Airlines,
Inc. 5 United Airlines, Inc. (United) employed Mr. Schleier as an airplane
captain. Under an established policy, United fired Mr. Schleier from his
position when he reached sixty. 6 Mr. Schleier sued under the ADEA in
federal district court. 1 The court consolidated his claim with a class action
suit brought by other former United employees with similar claims.'" The jury
in the consolidated case found that United Airlines had engaged in willful
misconduct in violation of the ADEA. 9 The Fifth Circuit overturned the jury

its changes.
9. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).

10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes

14 to
41 to
73 to
99 to

40 and accompanying text.
72 and accompanying text.
98 and accompanying text.
124 and accompanying text.

14. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2162.
15. Id. at 2161.
16. Id.

17. See Monroe v. United Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985).
18. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2162.
19. SeeMonroe, 736 F.2d at 398.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/7
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verdict in favor of the former employees.2" Prior to the second trial, the
parties settled, and Mr. Schleier received $145,629 in damages.21 The
settlement agreement allocated fifty percent to back pay and fifty percent to
liquidated damages.22 Mr. Schleier's income tax return for 1986 included the
amount attributed to the back pay portion of the settlement but excluded the
portion attributed to liquidated damages.
Mr. Schleier argued that section 104(a)(2) of the Code excluded from
gross income the damages he received from the settlement agreement.24
Because he originally excluded only the amount attributed to liquidated
damages, he then sought a refund on the amounts attributed to back pay.'
Mr. Schleier argued that his award of liquidated damages and back pay
26
constituted "damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness.1
The Commissioner argued that the liquidated damages portion of the
settlement should have been included in Mr. Schleier's gross income for two
reasons.2 First, the Commissioner argued that liquidated damages under the
ADEA do not provide compensation to the victim of age discrimination.
Liquidated damages deter "willful violations" of the statute.28 Second, the
Commissioner argued that liquidated damages arise "on account of' the
employer's willful misconduct, not personal injury.29
The Tax Court postponed ruling on Schleier's case pending its ruling in
Downey v. Commissioner.3" In Downey, the Tax Court held that section
104(a)(2) and its accompanying regulations only excluded amounts recovered
from a tort or tort-like claim. 1 The Tax Court held that the back pay
portion of an ADEA settlement award arose from a tort like cause of action
and excluded those awards from gross income. 2

20. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2162.
21.
22.
23.
portion

Id.
Id.

Id. at 2162. United did not withhold any payroll or income taxes from the
of the settlement allocated to liquidated damages.

24. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2162.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Petitioner's Brief at 9, Commissioner v. Schleier (No. 94-500) 1994 WL
7212151.
28. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2162.
29. Id.
30. 97 T.C. 150 (1991), supp. op., 100 T.C. 634 (1993), rev'd,33 F.3d 836 (7th
Cir. 1994), cert.denied,115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995). This was the lead case in the United
Airlines settlement.
31. Downey, 97 T.C. at 160.
32. Id. at 169-70. The Tax Court further held that liquidated damages, while
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 7

A4SSOURILAWREVIEW

[Vol. 61

Following its determination in Downey, the Tax Court found in favor of
Mr. Schleier and allowed him to exclude from gross income the entire
settlement, including both the back pay and liquidated damages.33 The Tax
Court held that the settlement constituted "damages received.., on account
of personal injuries or sickness" under section 104(a)(2) of the Code.34 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion.35
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Fifth Circuit.36
The Court held that a taxpayer seeking to exclude judgment proceeds from
gross income must meet two tests. First, a taxpayer must demonstrate that
the underlying cause of action is based upon "tort or tort-type rights. 38
Second, the taxpayer must show that the damages were received "on account
of personal injuries or sickness.1 39 The Court found that neither of these two
tests were met by a claim arising from an ADEA settlement.4"
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

The Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967

Congress enacted The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(the ADEA) to combat age discrimination in the work-place.4 1 Congress
intended to promote employment of older people and find solutions to
problems of aging in general.42 To that end, Congress prohibited "arbitrary
age discrimination" in the work-place.43

punitive in nature, served a compensatory purpose and also were properly excluded.
Id. at 171-72.
33. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2162.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2161. See Schleier v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1994).
36. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2163.
37. Id. at 2167. The Supreme Court stated that the two tests were created by

§ 104(a)(2), the applicable regulations, and United States v. Burke, 540 U.S. 229
see also infra notes 55 through 59 and accompanying text.
Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
Id.
Id.
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994); see also Andrew M. Wright, Note,

(1992);
38.
39.
40.

Commissioner v. Schleier: An Approachfor Interpretingthe Exclusion UnderLA C.
Section 104(a)(2) of Awards of Settlements in FederalEmployment Discrimination
Claims, 70 NomE DAME L. REv. 991, 1002 (1995).

42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/7
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The ADEA grants a private cause of action for age discrimination and
provides for both legal and equitable remedies." A plaintiff under the
ADEA may sue for back pay and for liquidated damages.45 A plaintiff
cannot, however, collect compensatory damages for pain and suffering or
punitive damages. 6 An ADEA plaintiff also has equitable remedies
available, including injunctive relief, reinstatement, and awards of attorney's
fees.47 The ADEA additionally provides for a jury trial.48
B. Statutory History of Taxation of Damage Awards
The Internal Revenue Code broadly defines gross income.49 Clarifying
the broad scope of this statute, the Supreme Court found income to be an
"undeniable accession to wealth."5 However, section 104(a)(2) allows for
an exclusion from gross income those amounts received as damages for a
personal injury case.5
The Service promulgated regulations equating "personal injury" under
section 104(a)(2) with elements of tort law in 1960 and amended them in

44. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), (d) (1994).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), (d) (1994). The ADEA provides for liquidated damages
only for a "willful" violation of the statue.
46. See Wright, supra note 41, at 1003-04.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1994).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1994).
49. Gross income includes all income from whatever source derived. I.R.C.

§ 61(a) (1995); see also Commissionerv. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
50. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431.
51. § 104. Compensation for injuries or sickness.
(a) In General. Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in
excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc.,
expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include(1) amounts received under workmen's compensation acts as

compensation for personal injuries or sickness;
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or
agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on
account of personal injuries or sickness.

I.R.C. § 104 (1994).
In 1989, Congress amended § 104 by, among other changes, adding the following

sentence: Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with
a case involving physical injury or physical sickness. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1989 (amendment), Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641 (1989). This change, while
possibly altering the holding in cases after 1989, has no direct impact on cases arising
before 1989, such as Schleier.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 7

MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 61

1964.52 The regulations defined the term "damages received (whether by suit
or agreement)" as an amount received from the settlement of a claim or
through prosecution of a lawsuit or action based upon tort or tort-type
rights.53 Only damages from a personal injury case that involved a tort-like
cause of action would be excludable.54

C. Case History of Taxation of DamageAwards
The Supreme Court's previous pronouncementregarding the taxability of
back pay awards received as a result of a discrimination claim under section
104(a)(2) came in United States v. Burke.55 In Burke, the plaintiffs settled
a Title VII sexual discrimination case." Title VII at the time of the Burke
decision awarded only back pay and did not allow for a jury trial.5 Because
of these limitations, the Court found that Title VII did not provide for the "full
panoply" of remedies traditionally available in a tort claim.5" The Court held
that because Title VII allows only back pay awards and no jury trial, the
settlement award was not based on tort or tort-type rights.59

52. 25 Fed. Reg. 11402, Nov. 26, 1960, as amended by 29 Fed. Reg. 5070, April
14, 1964.
53. 75 Fed.Reg. 11,490 (1960); Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1991).
54. Wright, supranote 41, at 996.

55. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
56. Three female Tennessee Valley Authority (IVA) employees settled a Title VII
discrimination suit before trial. The plaintiffs alleged that female dominated positions
were not given pay raises whereas male dominated positions were. The settlement
called for $5 million in damages for all affected employees. The TVA withheld
federal income taxes and FICA taxes from the awards before payment to the
employees. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1868-69.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994) (limiting awards to backpay or reinstatement);
see also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192-7 (1974) (describing availability ofjury
trials for common-law forms of action and citing Title VII cases).
58. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874-75.

59. Id. at 1873-74. Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion found the Service's
interpretation of § 104(a)(2), in particular the "tort or tort-type rights" test,
troublesome. Id. at 1875. Justice Scalia found that "personal injury" in the statute
included only physical injuries and injuries to mental health. Id. Justice Scalia
rejected the definition of "personal injury" would include any non-contractual injury.
Id. Justice Scalia was the only Justice to take this position.
Justices O'Connor and Thomas argued that discrimination causes personal injury
in a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1878. Justices O'Connor and Thomas also disputed that
the remedial nature of the statute controlled the "tort or tort-type rights" analysis,
preferring to focus on the nature of the claim, i.e. discrimination. Id. at 1879. They
would have allowed the exclusion of the Title VII damage award under § 104(a)(2).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/7
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The appellate courts have found ADEA settlement awards more
troublesome to categorize for section 104(a)(2) purposes. In Rickel v.
Commissioner," the Third Circuit allowed the exclusion from gross income
of both back pay and liquidated damages under the ADEA.61 The Third
Circuit found that the claim was both a personal injury and involved tort-type
rights.6'
The Rickel court relied on a long string of civil rights and
discrimination cases to find that an ADEA claim was similar to a personal
injury claim.6'
In Schmitz v. Commissioner,' the Ninth Circuit also held that an ADEA
settlement amounted to a personal injury claim based on tort-type rights.65
The Ninth Circuit found that "liquidated" damages were traditionally
compensatory, not punitive.66 Assuming that the Supreme Court limited its
Burke holding to pre-1991 Title VII claims, the Schmitz court found that
ADEA claims allowed for more tort-like remedies than pre-1991 Title VII
claims67 and, therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that the ADEA settlement
award qualified for section 104(a)(2) exclusion from gross income.6"
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit, in Downey v. Commissioner,69 held that
section 104(a)(2) does not exclude ADEA damages from gross income
because those damages are not "on account of personal injury."7 Relying
on the Burke decision, the court found that the ADEA's compensatory scheme
did not create a tort-type cause of action. The damages allowed were not the
"broad range of compensatory damages.., that characterizetort-type personal
injury.""1 The Downey court held that without those remedies traditionally

Justice Souter concurred in the majority opinion. His concurring opinion
reasoned that the Service regulation required the claim to be based in tort, not contract.
Id. at 1877. Because Title VII at the time allowed only back pay awards, the claim
to Justice Souter was essentially a contract claim. Id. at 1878. In as much as Title
VII focused on contract remedies, the damage award failed to qualify for § 104(a)(2)
exclusion. Id.
60. 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
61. Id. at 663.
62. Id. at 661.
63. Id. at 662-63.
64. 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994).
65. Id. at 796.
66. Id. at 795-96. The court found support inthe fact that liquidated damages had
to be in relation to the back pay award.
67. Id. at 793-94.
68. Id. at 796.
69. 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
70. Id. at 840.
71. Id. at 839.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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available to tort claims, ADEA settlements could not qualify for section
104(a)(2) treatment.72
IV. INSTANT DECISION
3

A. Majority Opinion-

In Commissioner v. Schleier,74 the Supreme Court held that damages
received on account of a settlement of a claim under the ADEA failed to meet
the two-pronged test of Burke.75 The Court stated that to qualify for the
section 104(a)(2) exclusion, the award must arise "on account of personal
'
injuries."76
The Court offered a hypothetical car accident to demonstrate
what exactly
the "on account of' language in section 104(a)(2) really
77
means.

The Court also found that under the plain language of section 104(a)(2)
a taxpayer may not exclude any part of an ADEA settlement because the
ADEA award for back pay was not "on account of" personal injury.7 The
Court reasoned that the back pay award was wholly independent of any
personal injury and therefore failed to qualify as "on account of personal
injury. 09
The Court also refused to exclude the liquidated damages portion of the
settlement from Mr. Schleier's gross income on the basis that they served to
compensate him for injuries difficult to quantify. Citing Trans World.Airlines,
Inc. v. Thurston,8 ° the Court dismissed this claim as already decided." In
Thurston, the Court held that Congress intended liquidated damages under the
ADEA to be punitive in nature, unlike the Fair Labor Standards Act (the

72. Id.
73. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the majority, which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.
74. 115 S.Ct. 2159 (1995).
75. Id. at 2167.
76. Id.
at 2163.
77. Id. at 2163-64. The hypothetical assumes that a taxpayer is injured in a car
accident incurring (i.) medical expenses, (ii.) lost wages, and (iii.) pain, suffering and

emotional distress. The taxpayer settles for $30,000, all of which would qualify for
§ 104(a)(2) treatment.
78. Id.
at 2164.
79. Id.
80. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
81. Schleier, 115 S.Ct. at 2165.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/7
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"FSLA").' Accordingly, in Schleierthe Court held that liquidated damages
are not awarded "on account of personal injury."83
Next the Court dealt with Mr. Schleier's argument that, because the
ADEA is a tort-type cause of action, the settlement award should be
excluded. 84 The Court disputed whether the ADEA created a tort-type
right.8 5 Although the ADEA does allow jury trials and liquidated damages,
the Court concluded that, while it was a closer case than Burke, the ADEA
failed to qualify as a tort-type right.86 The Court stated that the ADEA
limited recovery to back wages, which were clearly economic damages, and
liquidated damages, which under Thurston had no compensatory function.'
Thus, the Court held that because the damages received from the
settlement of an ADEA claim are not "on account of personal injury" as
required by section 104(a)(2), and because the ADEA does not create a tort
or tort-type cause of action, Mr. Schleier could not exclude from gross income
either the liquidated or the back pay portion of the award.'
B. DissentingOpinion
The dissent began its analysis on the premise that, "[a]ge discrimination
inflicts personal injury." 9 Citing a string of unrelated discrimination cases,
the dissent stated that discrimination based on race and sex have long been
held to inflict personal injury.9" Justice O'Connor, who also dissented in
Burke, disagreed with the Court's reliance on the analysis of available
remedies to determine whether a claim was tort-like for purposes of section

82. Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S. at 125. The ADEA, § 626(b), provides that
the rights created under the ADEA are to be enforce in accordance with the remedies
and powers of the FLSA. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 579 (1978). Under the
FLSA, liquidated damages are mandatory in all cases, whereas under the ADEA,
liquidated damages are awarded only for "willful violations" of the statute. Compare
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (ADEA liquidated damages provision) with 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(FLSA liquidated damages provision).
83. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2165.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2166.
86. lid. at 2168.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2167.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2168 (citing Goodmanv. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987) (racial
discrimination); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (race and sex discrimination); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983)
(age discrimination)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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104(a)(2). 91 In Burke, Justice O'Connor noted, and seven other justices
agreed, that discrimination inflicts a personal injury.'
Justice O'Connor
argued that the majority opinion reversed that position, if not explicitly, then
accidentally.'
The Service's interpretation of section 104(a)(2) also drew attention from
the dissent. In Burke, the Court deferred to a Service regulation which stated
that discrimination could be a personal injury if the cause of action was tortlike.9 4 The Service in Schleier, however, argued that the tort-like standard
in Burke was not a conclusive test.95 The dissent found the ADEA to have
the appropriate "panoply" of remedies to make this a "tort-type" cause of
action as required by section 104(a)(2) and the applicable regulations. 6
Citing to Burke, the dissent claims that the Service and the Court in Burke
linked personal injury to these tort principles alone.' Because the dissent
would characterize ADEA suits as arising from tort or tort-type rights, the
damage award should fall under section 104(a)(2). 98

V. COMMENT
A. Philosophy of Section 104(a)(2)
Scholars have debated the reason for enacting section 104(a)(2) in
differing contexts.99 One common argument for excluding from gross

91. Id. at 2169.
92. Id. Only Justice Scalia, who concurred with the majority in Burke, argued
that personal injuries for § 104(a)(2) purposes were limited to physical and mental
health.
93. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2169-170.
94. Id. at 2170-71. Justice O'Connor also looked at 35 years of Service
interpretations, which state that a "tort-type right" conclusively established § 104(a)(2)
qualification. Because this interpretation has been considered reasonable for so long,
Justice O'Connor would hold the Service to this position.
95. Justice O'Connor notes that the Commissioner only argued the point that the
tort-like standard was not the exclusive requirement in one sentence of her reply Brief.
Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2171.
96. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2170.
97. Id. at 2171.
98. Id.
99. See J. Martin Burke and Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of EmploymentRelatedPersonalInjury Awards: The Needfor Limits, 50 MONT. L. REv. 13 (1989);
Wright, supra note 41, at 1019-25 (discussing possible motive of Congress for
adopting § 104(a)(2)); see also Scott E. Copple, How Many RemediesMake a Tort?
The Aftermath of U.S. v. Burke and Its Impact on the Taxability of Discrimination
Awards, 14 VA. TAx. RLv. 589 (1995) (discussing court treatment of § 104(a)(2)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/7
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income amounts received on account of a personal injury involves the "human
capital" theory."0 The human capital theory resembles the concept of basis
in tax law.10' In tort law, the return of capital is not "income" to a person,
but rather "makes a person whole."'"
In fact, early applications of this
principle found payments to a person on account of personal injury merely
103
reimbursed a victim for "a conversion of capital lost through... injury.
In a sense,
there is no "gain" to the taxpayer.104 The taxpayer only "breaks
0 5

even.0

100. Some scholars have suggested that Congress adopted the "human capital"
theory when it enacted § 104(a)(2)'s statutory predecessor. See, e.g., Wright, supra
note 41, at 995; Burke & Friel, supra note 99, at 14.
The legislative history of § 104(a)(2) begins with the Internal Revenue Act of
1918, § 213(b)(6). This provision excluded from gross income:
Amounts received, through accident orhealthinsurance orunderworkmen's
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus
the amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on
account of such injuries or sickness.
Pub. L. 65-254, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065-66 (1919).
A House Report accompanying § 213(b)(6) stated:
Under present law it is doubtful whether amounts received through
accident or health insurance, or under workmen's compensation acts, as
compensation for personal injury or sickness, and damages received on
account of such injuries or sickness, are required to be included in gross
income. The proposed bill provides that such amounts not be included in
gross income.
H.R. Rep. No. 767,65th Congress., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918), reprintedin 1939-1 C.B. 86,
92.
101. See Wright, supra note 41, at nn.258-265 and accompanying text; see also
Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J., dissenting).
In Hawkins, the dissent questioned how the human capital theory can be at all useful
in deciding whether punitive damages are return of capital or a windfall. More
specifically, how do value an arm, leg, or 30% use of a hand?
This difficulty in calculating an economic value for such a loss highlights the
limitations of this theory. In addition, the human capital theory fails to adequately
explain why back pay and punitive damages should be excluded from gross income.
See Wright, supra note 41, at 1022-23.
102. This presumes that a taxpayer would never realize gain because his basis in
his body or reputation would always exceed any amount realized from an ADEA
settlement. See Wright, supra note 41, at n.259.
103. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 308 (1918).
104. For example, there is no "accession to wealth." See the discussion of
Commissionerv. Glenshaw Glass, see supranotes 49-51 and accompanying text.
105. See Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Developing a Theory of Damage Recovery
Taxation, 14 WM. MrrNcBLL L. REv. 759, 766-68 (1988).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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Another theory justifying exclusion from gross income under section
104(a)(2) posits that the exclusion for damages in a personal injury case
prevents a taxpayer from having large amounts of income in one year.'
In the case of back pay, the progressive tax rate structure subjects a taxpayer
settling a claim to a larger tax bracket.0 7 The result from such a settlement
would force the taxpayer into a higher tax bracket and requires the taxpayer
to pay a higher tax bill.'08
Some commentators have also suggested that humanitarian motives
encouraged Congress to enact section 104(a)(2)."'S This theory proposes
that victims have suffered enough at the hands of others and should not now
be a victim of an Internal Revenue Service audit." 0 In Schleier, the
taxpayers argued compassion for the victim advanced the objectives of the
ADEA and other anti-discriminatory laws."'
B. Section 104(a)(2) Should Exclude From Gross Income
Amounts Received From DiscriminationSuits.
When Congress enacted section 104(a)(2), it failed to include a solid
policy or logical justification of its purpose. Without such a justification, the
courts and the Service are left to interpret the statute without any reliable
Congressional guidance. This statute has existed since the early 20th century

106. Wright, supra note 41, at 1021-22.
107. Wright, supra note 41, at 1021-22.
108. Wright gives a good example of this problem. Assume an employee is fired
from his or her job and sues under the ADEA. The parties settle for $200,000 of back
pay for the 4 years he or she was unemployed. Since the taxpayer must realize all
$200,000 in the year of payment, the taxpayer would have a 39% tax bracket. If the
taxpayer received $50,000 over 4 years while working, he or she would have a much
lower bracket and subsequently lower tax liability. Wright, supra note 41, 1021-22.
It would be possible to spread income from a settlement award over a period of
years, allowing for potential recognition over time. This problem, however, is beyond
the scope of this case note.
109. See Burke and Friel, supra note 99, at 43; Margaret Henning, Recent
Developments in the Tax Treatment of Personal Injury and Punitive Damage
Recoveries, 45 TAx LAW. 783, 797 (1992) (arguing that Congress probably did not

intend for non-physical injuries or punitive damages to be treated as a "humanitarian"
recovery.)
110. In Roemer v. Commissioner,the Ninth Circuit wrote that he humanitarian
theory posits that an injured party should not be burdened with the responsibility of
sorting out taxable and non-taxable portions of a judgment or settlement award. 716
F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 1983).
111. Brief for Respondent at 24, Commissionerv. Schleier (No. 94-500) 1994
WL 721251.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/7
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but still causes far too much confusion and debate. Congress needs to step
forward and explain exactly how awards for discrimination suits should be
handled.
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent in Schleier, appropriately points to the
fundamental problem in the majority decision."' That problem lies in the
Court's failure to recognize that discrimination causes personal injury.'
Justice O'Connor notes that the analysis of the majority equates personal
injury with only tangible injuries, as Justice Scalia argued in his opinion in
Burke."' This contradicted, perhaps even overturned, many of the Supreme
Court's prior
rulings which held that discrimination caused personal
5
injuries.1
The Schleierdecision creates more confusion than necessary. An ADEA
claim, before Schleier, appeared to fit the requirements for section 104(a)(2)
exclusion." 6 The Court finds that in addition to failing the tort type rights
test, an ADEA claim also fails to pass the "on account of' language of section
104(a)(2) itself. Justice O'Connor again points out that creating the second
aspect, the "on account of' language, departs from the Service's own
interpretation of section 104(a)(2) as found in Treasury Regulation 1.104l(c).'" With this holding, the Court undercut thirty-five years of Service
interpretations and Rulings."'
The ambiguity of section 104(a)(2) creates a need for consistent
interpretation. No such consistency has been forthcoming from the courts or
the service. Now Congress needs to act. Over the last thirty-five years, the

112. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167-72.

113. In the majority opinion, the court writes, "§ 104(a)(2) does not permit the
exclusion of... back wages because the recovery of back wages was not 'on account

of' any personal injury." Id. at 2164 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 2169.
115. Id. at 2170.
116. Under Burke, the court stated that a pre-1991 Title VII claim failed to
qualify for § 104(a)(2) exclusion because it did not entitle the plaintiff to the "full
panoply" of remedies that created a tort-type right. An ADEA claim appears to fit the

requirements of a "full panoply" of remedies, including:
a. a jury trial-ADEA § 626(c)(2);
b. legal or equitable relief-ADEA § 626(c)(1); and
c.
liquidated damages,whichunder Thurston are considered punitive damages;
traditionally available under tort law-ADEA § 626(b).
What other remedies are needed to make a tort-type claim are unclear. The majority
simply states, "though this is a closer case than Burke, we conclude that a recovery

under the ADEA is not one that is "based on tort or tort type rights."" Schleier, 115
S. Ct. at 2167.
117. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2171.
118. Id.
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Service and the courts have not built a consensus as to the meaning of section
104(a)(2), and now is the time to settle the issue.
C. Need for CongressionalAction
The lack of clear policy behind section 104(a)(2) creates a number of
problems when planning a tax strategy. Congress should resolve this problem
and clarify the policy and application behind section 104(a)(2).
Some commentators have suggested Congress should repeal section
104(a)(2) all together." 9 This path, however, would seriously disadvantage
taxpayers who suffer serious injury requiring expensive medical help. While
this solution would end any and all debate on the issue, efficiency and ease
of administration are not always the best social policy.
Other commentators have suggested amending the section to apply only
to cases of physical injury, but not to punitive damages, back pay, or general
economic losses.12 What the courts need most is a uniform standard to
apply to these types of cases.
Congress should amend section 104(a)(2) to allow for exclusion from
gross income any amounts received from any discrimination suit, whether
under the ADEA, American's with Disabilities Act, or the Equal Pay Act.
Since these anti-discrimination statutes are based primarily on humanitarian
motives, allowing for section 104(a)(2) exclusion would further the objectives
of those statutes."'
Further justification for amending section 104(a)(2) comes from the
disparity that may arise between different anti-discrimination statutes. While
the Supreme Court now requires all ADEA awards to be included in gross
income, the Court has not ruled on whether awards from other federal antidiscrimination statutes or other similar state statutes should be included in
gross income."2 While all these statutes have the same purpose, eliminating
discrimination, they are being afforded different tax treatment by courts on
often awkward legal analysis."
After Schleier, it would appear that no awards under any antidiscrimination statute would qualifyfor section 104(a)(2) exclusion from gross

119. See Mark W. Cochran, Should PersonalInjury DamageAwards Be Taxed,
38 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 43, 64-65 (1987-88); Wright, supranote 41, at n.271 and
accompanying text.
120. Wright, supra note 41, at n.272-75 and accompanying text.
121. Congress passedthe ADEA, "to promote employment of older persons based
on their ability rather than age." 26 U.S.C. § 621 (b) (1988).
122. See Wright, supranote 41, at n.308-09 and accompanying text.
123. Wright, supranote 41, at 1029. Wright noted that the 4th Circuit has held
that an EPA award was taxable but suggested that an ADEA claim was not taxable.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/7
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income. This question, however, has important policy ramifications that
Congress should resolve, not the courts. Many policy considerations are
properly handled by the courts. Unfortunately the Court has still not created
a satisfactory uniform treatment of section 104(a)(2) claims."' If Congress
amended section 104(a)(2) to apply to all anti-discrimination statutes, the
spectrum of employment discrimination could be treated equally and fairly.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Schleier decision defined what may be excluded from a taxpayer's
gross income when settling an ADEA claim-nothing. This decision took
damages received under an ADEA claim out of section 104(a)(2) treatment.
More importantly the Supreme Court established a standard by which all
future damage awards will be measured for section 104(a)(2) exclusion. A
damage award must be "on account of personal injury or sickness" and must
arise out of a tort or tort-type cause of action. Failure to meet either of these
criteria will result if a denial of the section 104(a)(2) exclusion. While this
bright line test is sure to deter many taxpayers from attempting to claim an
exclusion, the Court's opinion seems to overturn a long series of precedent
and rulings established by the Service and the Supreme Court. By denying
the exclusion, the Court made clear its position on back pay and punitive
damages-they do not arise on account of personal injuries.
While this holding takes a firm stance on the meaning of an ambiguous
statute, the Court missed an opportunity to promote equal employment
opportunity. Congress now should act to grant section 104(a)(2) treatment to
employment discrimination awards. By doing so, Congress will make clear
its intent to treat discrimination as creating a personal injury, something courts
acknowledged long before the Schleier case.
DAVID ERROL TOMPKINS

124. See Henning, supranote 109, at 804.
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